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Abstract: 
 
Retention is a crucial issue, especially in the all volunteer HM Royal Navy. Naval manpower planners 
need to consider appropriate measures to improve retention in the service.  The paper considers a 
number of factors that affect the likelihood of early exits from the navy. We classify these factors as 
external (macroeconomic, and labour market conditions) and internal (job specific) factors. The 
paper uses a Cox proportional hazard approach to measure individual naval ratings’ propensity to 
leave early from the navy. 
 
The results show that gender is a significant factor affecting propensity to leave the navy. Females are 
more likely to leave when compared to their male counterparts irrespective of age.  The results also 
indicate that married females are more likely to leave (around 1.1 times more likely to do so) when 
compared to their unmarried counterparts indicating that marital status transitions are very influential 
in explaining separations from the navy.  
 
Overall the empirical results suggest that the navy should concentrate more on the needs and 
requirements of high-risk exit groups, with particular emphasis on ‘work/life’ balance. In addition, 
appropriate mechanisms need to be put in place in order to inform naval ratings of the relative 
financial benefits of staying within the navy as compared to civilian life. Naval manpower planners 
should also promote aggressively the non – pecuniary benefits (medical care, subsidised 
accommodation, job security etc.) offered by the navy to their personnel. 
 
Key words: exits, retention, Royal Navy, Cox proportional hazard 
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Retention is a crucial issue, especially in the all volunteer HM Royal Navy. Naval 
manpower planners need to consider appropriate measures to improve retention in the 
service.  The paper considers a number of factors that affect the likelihood of early exits 
from the navy. We classify these factors as external (macroeconomic, and labour 
market conditions) and internal (job specific) factors. The paper uses a Cox 
proportional hazard approach to measure individual naval ratings’ propensity to leave 
early from the navy. 
 
The results show that gender is a significant factor affecting propensity to leave the 
navy. Females are more likely to leave when compared to their male counterparts 
irrespective of age.  The results also indicate that married females are more likely to leave 
(around 1.1 times more likely to do so) when compared to their unmarried counterparts 
indicating that marital status transitions are very influential in explaining separations from 
the navy.  
 
Overall the empirical results suggest that the navy should concentrate more on the needs 
and requirements of high-risk exit groups, with particular emphasis on ‘work/life’ 
balance. In addition, appropriate mechanisms need to be put in place in order to inform 
naval ratings of the relative financial benefits of staying within the navy as compared to 
civilian life. Naval manpower planners should also promote aggressively the non – 
pecuniary benefits (medical care, subsidised accommodation, job security etc.) offered 
by the navy to their personnel. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the major concerns facing the Royal Navy today is that of achieving the right manpower 
mix – the effective structural balance in terms of numbers and skills of officers and naval ratings 
to man tomorrow’s fleet. The achievement of manpower balance and reduced gapping remains 
of fundamental significance to the sustained delivery of the manpower component of the Royal 
navy’s strategy. The success of this is greatly dependent upon improved levels of retention. Early 
or premature voluntary exits from the US navy have been recognised as an important problem 
for naval manpower managers in terms of achieving high retention levels (Daula and Moffitt 
1995, Booth-Kewley et al. 2002). The most recent strategic defence review from the Ministry of 
Defence recognises this as applying to the UK navy, arguing that higher exit rates from the UK 
Armed Forces are adding to manning difficulties (Strategic Defence Review (SDR) 2002).  
 
In a UK context, the effect of premature voluntary exits (PVR) for the Royal Navy equates to 
about 23-25% of total rating recruits per annum (Second Sea-Lord Retention Campaign and 
Performance Report 2002). Facing a high PVR rate, the navy is trying to cope with two sets of 
problems. On the one hand, recruiting and training are costly activities. Dealing with high early 
exit rates entails the recruitment of high numbers of naval naval ratings each time in order to 
replace those who are leaving. Thus, cutting down on early exits from the navy, would reduce 
recruitment and training costs for the navy. On the other hand, dealing with high PVR rates 
generates a ‘vicious cycle’ for the navy. Having to deal with a high number of exits, the navy has 
to overutilise the remaining human resources. This will increase operational tempo, create extra 
workload, and generate frustration among those who decide to stay. From this, it is easy to see 
that high PVR problems will in time escalate to an even bigger problem for the navy, putting at 
risk the navy’s ability to meet its multitask role in current affairs. 
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The aim of this paper is to identify appropriate policy initiatives to address manpower gaps in 
strategic ranks and specialisations in the Royal navy (RN). In order to achieve this, the paper will 
evaluate the importance of three categories of explanatory variables on the propensity to leave 
early from the Royal navy. These three categories are: macroeconomic factors (claimant count 
rate, the civilian wage and inflation rates), job specific (length of service, navy specialisation, rank, 
and operational tempo), and person specific (age, marital status, and gender) factors. We identify 
macro – economic considerations as external factors (because they are external to the navy). 
Person and job specific variables are considered as internal factors (because they are mainly 
related to navy employment conditions). Within the literature, Clark (2001) argues that quits 
decline with the attractiveness of the features of the current job, an improvements in economic 
conditions (i.e., wage rate).  Crayton et al. (2003) suggest that naval ratings’ socio-demographic 
variables may convey information about their ‘taste for the navy, while Weiss et al. (2002) argue 
that military families are subject to greater influence from family and dependents’ than non-
military families. This paper goes beyond this literary heritage, to undertake a more strategic and 
all compassing analysis of the issues and contributing factors.   
 
The evaluation of the particular effects of these factors on navy ratings’ decisions to leave early 
from the service will inform RN manpower planners in future policy initiatives, and tackling 
these factors will give rise to three natural affects. First, there will be substantial cost – cutting 
implications for the operations of the RN, and allowing the navy to utilise its financial and 
human factors more efficiently. Second, the exercise will allow the navy to fulfil its complex role  
more effectively. Thirdly, the exercise will challenge long-held human resource management 
policies currently in practice. Currently, navy manpower planners believe that PVR related exits 
from the service are an area they have least control over. The paper supports the argument that 
the effect of voluntary exits from the RN can be influenced if appropriate policies are put in 
place.  
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The data used in this paper was supplied by the navy (JobStats database) and manpower analysis 
and reporting system (MARS) supplied by the defence analytical services agency (DASA) under a 
data disclosure agreement. It contains manpower information for each person employed in the 
navy, including their deployment records and information on the individual’s marital status and 
so on. The full dataset used in this paper contains approximately 50000 individual naval ratings. 
The data consists of individuals who joined the navy well before the sample period, some of 
which left during the sample period (delayed entry), while others are still working in the navy. It 
also includes individuals who joined the service during the sample period. Again, some of these 
individuals have since left the service (early exists) while others are still serving (censored 
observations). All the econometric estimations in this report were carried out using data from 
April 1996 to June 2002. 
 
In the next section of the analysis (section 2) the paper will review relevant work in the area 
addressing the effect of explanatory variables on quits and exits. Section 3 (empirical analysis) will 
consider the derived results (non – parametric and semi – parametric). Section 4 will deal with the 
discussion of the results and the resulting policy implications arising therefrom. Finally, the paper 
will conclude with a summary of the main points arising from the discussion (section 5). 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW & PREVIOUS WORK 
The recent focus on quit behaviour in labour economics stems from the fact that job satisfaction 
(and job utility) is derived from a bundle of characteristics, specific either to the job, or the 
individual. Individual naval ratings decide whether to stay or exit from the navy on the basis of 
comparisons between the derived utility from pecuniary (financial) and non – pecuniary (non – 
financial) factors. They will decide to leave if pecuniary and non – pecuniary rewards in the 
civilian economy outweigh those provided by the navy. The paper follows the standard job – 
search theory framework. The dependent variable is annual PVR  hazard rate.  
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The assumption is that when macroeconomic conditions are positive, then quit rates and 
propensity to leave the navy will rise. At this point it is important to note that the financial 
rewards set in place by the navy are very competitive with those offered in the civilian labour 
market, so naval ratings’ decisions to leave the service are not based on actual pecuniary rewards, 
but rather on expected, or perceived ones. Thus, the perceived influence of macroeconomic 
conditions could potentially provide an accurate picture of the sort of influences the state of the 
civilian economy exerts on naval ratings’ decisions to leave the navy (Steel 1996). In other words, 
when naval ratings’ perceptions about the economic climate are positive the likelihood of quitting 
the navy will increase, and thus macroeconomic considerations will feature very prominently on 
naval ratings’ decision making process. We make the assumption that naval ratings are 
demonstrably influenced by macro-economic conditions exhibit an opportunistic behaviour, 
trying to use the potential positive economic climate in the civilian economy in order to secure 
higher pecuniary rewards. LeFrere, discussing the increasing competition between the navy and 
the private sector for skilled navy officers argued that “Opportunities in the private sector lure 
individuals … into leaving the service after their initial obligation is fulfilled. The navy must find 
ways to compete with the civilian sector …” (LeFrere, 2001: 13).  
 
Historical evidence presented by the Defence Analytical Service Agency (DASA) (1994) showed 
that when civilian unemployment is high, PVR related exits from the navy are low, and vice 
versa. This relationship indicates that the navy is increasingly finding itself in competition with 
the civilian labour market, especially in high – tech jobs, where there are job vacancies due to the 
changing structure of the economy (Wyatt, 1999). Bellany (2003) has extended this inverse 
relationship between positive economic conditions (e.g., unemployment) with retention and quits 
to the British Army. Carnicer et al. (2004) provided empirical support to the argument that there 
is a positive relationship between manpower exit rates and the General UK Annual Earning 
Index. A high (low) wage rate would decrease (stimulate) retention in the Royal navy. McLauhlin 
(1990) and Galizzi and Lang (1998) have also examined the positive relationship between the 
wage rate and quit decision in the civilian labour force. It is an observation that is also confined 
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to the UK. D’Addio and Rosholm (2005) have confirmed the above assumption in the context of 
job mobility in temporary jobs in Europe, albeit for male workers only.  
 
The other category of variables employed in the analysis of the effects of PVR related exits from 
the navy is that of person – specific factors. There should be some apparent differences between 
different groups of navy naval ratings. For example, it is expected that male naval ratings are 
more likely to develop a ‘taste’ for navy life as compared to female naval ratings (Crayton et al. 
2003), or that naval ratings belonging in different age groups behave differently in terms of PVR 
exits from the Service. Thus, following Bender et al. (2005) gender differences would appear 
crucial in explaining job satisfaction, and thus propensity to quit among recruits. However, other 
studies dealing with the propensity to leave/stay in the military did not report such a clear cut 
division between male and female naval ratings (Cregan and Johnston 1993). Age and marital 
status (married – unmarried) would also be expected to influence the probability of quitting the 
navy, with unmarried naval ratings more likely to quit, and older naval ratings less likely to leave 
early from the navy. Characteristically, LeFrere summarised the effect of marital status on 
propensity to leave the navy arguing that “Family issues and quality of life concerns were the 
number one reason … cited for leaving the navy to seek a more stable family environment” 
(LeFrere, 2001: 11).  
 
Finally, the remaining sets of potential variables affecting the propensity to leave the navy early 
are job – specific variables (navy rank and specialisation, promotion path, years of length of 
service (LoS) and number of deployments at sea duty (operational tempo). This set of 
explanatory variables captures the quality of work, or job satisfaction. If job satisfaction in navy 
employment decreases, then the likelihood of quitting will be higher, and as Clark (1997) and 
Bender et al. (2005) found job satisfaction is a very good predictor of future quits/exits from a 
current employment contract (albeit in the civilian labour market). LeFrere (2001) confirmed the 
above argument in the context of U.S. navy junior officers.  
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With respect to the effect of the promotion path on propensity to leave the navy, Clark (1997) 
found that it is positively correlated with job satisfaction and negatively with quits. In a very 
hierarchical organisation such as the navy, those naval ratings who do not progress up the ranks 
are more likely to leave the navy as compared to those who are more successful. The other factor 
that attracts a lot of attention when analysing propensity to leave from the navy is the number of 
deployments at sea duty. According to Warner and Goldberg (1984) and Bellany (2003), an 
increase in operational tempo creates a lot of tension and disturbance in the work – family 
balance for naval ratings (also see Fullerton (2003)). This can contribute to dissatisfaction among 
naval recruits. Carnicer et al. (2004) found a positive and significant correlation between 
disturbances in the work – family balance and the propensity to leave employment. In fact, the 
Royal Navy (SDR, 2002) has recognised the importance attached to disturbances in naval ratings’ 
family lives caused by increased operational tempo, and are actively persuing policies to minimise 
the negative effects on retention in the fleet.  
 
3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
For the empirical analysis, a Cox proportion hazard approach is used. The Cox proportional 
hazard approach is a duration model that is particularly suitable for analysing time-to-event 
individual level defence manpower data. Stepanova (2003) defines duration analysis as a 
collection of statistical techniques to analyse lifetime data.  As we are interested in the amount of 
time, or spell, that an individual navy rating spends in one state (employed in the navy) before 
transitioning into another state (quitting the navy), this model is particularly apt in the form of 
survival analysis. It also has the ability to cope with censored data, as the event of interest may 
not always be observed (or individuals may not exit early from the naval service). In the current 
research context Cox proportional hazard models are used to examine the decision of navy naval 
ratings to quit the Service at any point in their career.  
 
Within the Cox proportional hazard approach, predicted hazard rates of quit at cohort (i.e. age, 
held rank, specialisations, marital status, gender etc.) level, as well as the individual level are 
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produced. The hazard rate is defined as the probability of leaving the navy within some small 
time interval, conditional on the probability of the navy rating still being employed when that 
interval started. The hazard rate is the exponential of the maximum likelihood coefficient for 
each explanatory variable. The advantage of reporting hazard rates (or propensity to exit) is that 
their interpretation is more intuitive than the coefficient from non-linear models such as 
maximum likelihood estimation methods. A hazard rate of less than 1 infers to the percentage 
effect (e.g., 0.89 means 89% more) and a value above 1 infers to the number of times (e.g., -2.3 
means 2.3 times less than the reference category) (Kiefer 1988). This tool helps branch managers 
identify the individuals and groups with a high risk of early quitting. The majority of our control 
variables are discrete (time – constant) in nature, apart from the effect of LoS on the likelihood 
of quitting from the navy, which varies with time. 
 
Duration models can be categorised in three broad groups, depending on the assumption 
regarding the distribution of their hazard rate. The literature has identified non – parametric, semi 
– parametric, and parametric models. Non – parametric and semi – parametric are the most 
popular survival models in the literature because they make no assumption about the baseline 
hazard rate, whereas parametric hazard models use various statistical distributions for the 
baseline function. Thus, non – parametric models cannot be used to estimate the effect of 
explanatory variables explicitly. In the current research setting, non – parametric models will be 
considered with respect to the effect of LoS on propensity to quit the navy. On the other hand, 
semi – parametric models such as Cox PH model examine the effect of a number of covariates 
(X) and time spells (t) on the hazard rate. Nevertheless, Ohno-Machado (2001) argues that non – 
parametric models could use more that one variable (e.g., time and gender) for comparative 
analysis between groups of individuals.  
 
Due to the fact that Cox proportional hazard models estimate the hazard ratio over a prolonged 
period of time, they are also known as ‘multiple point models’ (Ohno-Machado 2001). An 
advantage of the Cox proportional hazard method is the fact that researchers do not need to 
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make a priori distributional assumptions about the hazard function as aforementioned 
(Petrongolo 2001, Light 1996). According to Treveteras and Eide (1999), the ability to estimate 
the baseline hazard non – parametrically provides great flexibility to Cox proportional hazard 
(PH) models, compared to other approaches (binary logit, and probit models). Another 
advantage of PH analysis is that it allows the examination of exit behaviour from the navy to be 
modelled explicitly, with the period of time leaving the navy (t) not being arbitrarily selected at a 
discrete time (using probit and logit models). Instead be explicitly included in the estimation 
process (baseline hazard function) (Kidd 1995). Hence, the timing of leaving the navy in the 
context of where it interrupts naval ratings’ LOS in the navy can be fully analysed. Following the 
argument above, Light (1996) argued that the static discrete time, discrete choice models are 
biased because they analyse the potential outcome (exit from the navy) as if it is made “at an 
isolated and known point in the life cycle” (Light 1996: 382).  
 
Common to both non – parametric and semi – parametric models is the notion of hazard 
function. The Cox PH model specifies a hazard rate h (u) as a function of a baseline hazard rate 
h0 (u) and a vector of regressors X and parameters β. The baseline hazard function corresponds 
to null values of covariates (Kiefer 1988) in vector X (personal, or job specific variables). 
According to Simonoff and Ma (2003: 140) this means that “the baseline hazard corresponds to 
that when each of the covariates equals zero, or otherwise”. In practical terms, the fact that the 
baseline hazard function assumes that each one of the covariates in the vector X is zero, means 
that it is assumed to be the same across the estimating sample, so covariates are assumed to shift 
the baseline hazard proportionately, without affecting its shape (Boheim and Taylor 2002). In this 
case, the vector of covariates affects the hazard function proportionately. Following that, we 
define the hazard function as:  
buXuhuXuh )()())(,( 0 += , or alternatively; 
])(exp[)())(,( 0 εβ += uXuhuXuh . 
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In the equations above, the baseline hazard function ho (u) depends on time (t), but not on X. 
This indicates the conditionality, or duration dependence of the hazard function (Boheim and 
Taylor 2000). On the other hand, the exponential part of the equation exp [X (u) β + ε], or exp 
(β’ X) depends on vector X, but is not influenced by any duration effect (t). Thus, the role of the 
hazard function is to provide a basis for defining ‘duration dependence’. The hazard function h (t) 
emphasises this conditionality of duration probabilities (Simonoff and Ma 2003).  
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
This part of the analysis categorises naval ratings into cohorts (according to their time of entry to 
the Service) and produces a number of cohort life time tables to analyse the impact of time on 
propensity to leave early from the service. The non – parametric analysis of the results focuses 
mainly on the impact of the duration effect (LoS) on propensity to quit the navy. A number of 
explanatory variables are interacted with the length of service (LOS) variable in order to provide 
useful insights regarding the effect of these variables on the propensity to leave for different 
groups of navy naval ratings.  
 
The following graph (Graph 1) shows the overall effect of the duration variable on propensity to 
quit the navy. It depicts the proportion of navy naval ratings at risk of leaving early (quitting) 
from the Service. The exit rates are around 25-30% on the year of joining the navy (training 
waste). This rate declines quite significantly in the next two years and then starts rising after the 
third year. The peak of exit rates for all naval ratings is around 4 to 7 years of LoS. Thus, once 
naval ratings pass the introductory period as full blown sailors (3 years LoS onwards) and move 
on to the high risk period (4 to 13 years LoS), their propensity to quit the navy rises progressively 
(around 3 times more likely to quit during this period of time when compared to any other 
period in their navy career). In terms of the main risk groups, all navy naval ratings with LOS 
between 4-13 years have significantly higher exit rates from the navy compared to any other 
period during their career. The modelling process in this paper mainly focuses on these risk 
groups. Nevertheless, the prospect of a very competitive pension and other one-off payments 
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received by naval ratings upon termination of their career in the navy (a lump sum, which the 
navy calls a terminal grant) reduces the effect of quits from the navy early. Overall, the results 
from Graph 1 confirm the argument that the likelihood of quitting the Service reaches a peak 
during the 1st year in Service, and then during the 4th to 13th year of service.  
[Graph 1 – About Here] 
 
Analysis of Semi – Parametric Results 
Moving on to the analysis of semi – parametric results, the paper considers the effect of 
macroeconomic, job and person specific variables, on the propensity to leave the navy. The 
analysis is performed through a Cox PH hazards model. The regression results (the ‘base model’) 
are summarised in Table 1 below. The analysis also considers a disaggregated Cox PH hazard 
model in order to examine the effect of covariates on male and female naval ratings’ decisions to 
exit the Service.  
[Table 1 – About Here] 
 
As far as the effect of the macroeconomic variables is concerned, the results indicate that a 
marginal increase in claimant count and inflation rate would reduce the propensity to leave the 
navy by 17.5% and 9% respectively. Graph 2 below indicates that as the claimant count 
unemployment rate experiences a gradual decline over the years, exit rates from the navy among 
different rating cohorts follow an upward trend over the same period of time.  The effect of the 
unemployment rate in particular could be compared to the findings of Fullerton (2003), who 
quantified the effect of unemployment rate in US Air Force personnel decision-making by 
arguing that “Each percentage increase in male unemployment rate reduced the probability of 
separation by almost 20%” (Fullerton, 2003: 351). 
[Graph 2 – About Here] 
 
A tight labour market will contribute towards higher exit rates from the navy. This shows that a 
thriving civilian economy with low unemployment and inflation rates causes high exit rates 
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because navy personnel perceives these to be better and greater employment opportunities 
outside the navy than they do in an economic downturn. This can be taken to imply that naval 
personnel are ‘cashing in’ the training received in the navy during periods of improved 
macroeconomic conditions. As employers find it difficult to fill vacancies in the civilian 
economy, exit rates from the Royal Navy increase. Hence, following Steel (1996), economic 
conditions have a great impact on the opportunities that are visible to the individual. The more 
jobs there are available, and the lower the inflation rate, the more likely are naval ratings to leave. 
Graph 3 below suggests that as the claimant count rate increases, so does cohort exit rates from 
the navy. The above pattern seems to be the same for all three cohorts, with the 1992 cohort 
exhibiting the closest relationship with unemployment. 
[Graph 3 – About Here] 
 
On the other hand, the civilian wage rate is positively related to exits from the navy, since a 1% 
increase in the earnings index results in a 14.3% increase in the propensity to quit. When the 
prospective job offers remuneration that exceeds current pay plus transition costs, then the 
likelihood of moving into alternative occupations is high (D’Addio and Rosholm 2005). In that 
way, relative pay (e.g., measuring expected future income streams if employed in the civilian 
sector) exerts a positive influence on exit levels from the navy. The assumption behind this 
relationship is that navy personnel want to ‘cash-in’ on the training received in the navy in the 
form of better paid job elsewhere in the civilian economy.  
 
As far as job – specific variables are concerned, Table 1 suggests that the naval ratings’ 
promotion path and navy specialisation exerts a considerable effect on propensity to leave the 
Service. In particular, those naval ratings who are not as upwardly mobile as their counterparts, 
and those in low skilled specialisations (such as those belonging to the warfare branch), would be 
more likely to leave early from the Service. Characteristically, naval ratings from the mechanical 
engineering rank (MNE2) that have not progressed into another rank were 52% more likely to 
leave the navy, whereas their counterparts from the same rank who moved on to the petty officer 
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rank (MNE2?PO) were 7.4% less likely to leave the navy early. Operational tempo is a good 
indicator of the above trend. At low levels of deployments at sea duties (once or twice), naval 
ratings were on average 44% more likely to quit. Nevertheless, as the frequency of sea duties 
increases, naval ratings are less likely to leave (a drop of 30% in likelihood on average). The ‘taste 
for navy life’ that many naval ratings develop over the years also seems to affect propensity to 
exit. This means that once naval ratings get used to the routine and the requirements of navy 
employment, they settle down and their likelihood of quitting the navy declines. 
 
Regarding the effect of person – specific attributes on the likelihood of exit, the evidence from 
Table 1 suggests that young naval ratings are 2.7% more likely to leave the navy early compared 
to more senior naval ratings. This means that younger naval ratings decide to leave the navy and 
start searching for other employment while their employability in the civilian economy is still 
high. This observation confirms the argument that young naval ratings perceive the navy as a 
‘stepping – stone’ employment opportunity securing a better job in the civilian labour market. 
Life – cycle transitions also exert an influence on naval ratings’ decision making process with 
unmarried naval ratings’ propensity to quit the navy being 33% higher than that of married naval 
ratings. Thus, the fewer family commitments naval ratings have, the higher their propensity to 
leave the Service.  
 
Estimating the results separately for male and female naval ratings reveals some considerable 
differences.  To start with, female naval ratings are on the whole 14% more likely to quit the navy 
as compared to their male counterparts. Female naval ratings seem to be more sensitive to 
changes in the wage rate, whereas male naval ratings appear to be more influenced by changes in 
unemployment and inflation rates in the civilian economy. As shown in columns 2 and 3 of Table 
1, propensity to leave the navy increases for married females, but declines for married males. The 
evidence summarised in Graph 4 below also identifies substantial differences between genders in 
the effect of marital status. Married female naval ratings are more likely to quit when compared 
to their unmarried female counterparts, whereas roles are reversed for males, with unmarried 
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males more likely to quit when compared to married males. Extending the results from the 1st 
column of Table 1 on to naval ratings’ full LoS in the navy would reveal that females are 
consistently more likely to quit the navy as compared to males (Graph 5 below). Also, the age 
variable exerts a significant and negative effect on the propensity of males to quit the navy, but 
does not exert any influence in the case of female naval ratings. Thus, the effect of the age 
variable on the propensity to quit the navy identified above is largely generated from the male 
subsample.  
[Graph 4 – About Here] 
[Graph 5 – About Here] 
 
To investigate in greater depth differences among navy naval ratings, the paper has considered a 
number of interactions between person (gender, marital status) and job – specific (LoS, navy 
specialisation) factors. Table 2 below considers the impact on the propensity to leave the navy 
through the interaction of gender (female) with navy specialisation. According to the evidence, 
female naval ratings belonging to engineering branches (air, marine, or weapons engineers) are 
less likely to leave the navy than their male counterparts in the same branches. This observation 
suggests that female naval ratings are more loyal (e.g., less likely to leave the navy) than male 
naval ratings when employed in highly skilled occupations in the navy.  
[Table 2 – About Here] 
 
The upper part on Table 3 below summarises the discussion regarding married females and males 
in the navy, while the lower part of the Table focuses on unmarried naval ratings. As far as the 
married naval ratings are concerned, it appears that unmarried female naval ratings belonging to 
engineering branches (air, marine, weapons) are less likely to leave the navy compared to their 
married male counterparts. For example, married females in the AEA_APPS specialisation were 
almost 65% less likely to leave the navy during the latter parts of their career in the navy (19 – 23 
years LOS in the Service). On the other hand, married females belonging to the warfare branch 
were more likely to leave than married males in the same branch. The same conclusion can be 
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derived from a careful consideration of the behaviour of unmarried naval ratings (lower part of 
Table 3). In both cases (married and unmarried) females appear to be more loyal (e.g., lower 
propensity to leave the navy) when employed in highly skilled occupations involving considerable 
levels of training, compared to male naval ratings in the same branch specialisations.  
[Table 3 – About Here] 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The consideration of the empirical results from the Cox PH models above identifies three 
particular areas of attention. These are: 
• The perceived effect of macroeconomic considerations,  
• Life – cycle transitions (identified through person – specific factors such as marital status, 
and age, as well as gender), and,    
• Job – specific influences.  
Starting with macroeconomic considerations, the results in hand suggest that navy personnel tend 
to perceive financial opportunities in the civilian sector to be superior to the navy’s financial 
rewards. This implies that once conditions in the civilian economy are favourable, naval ratings 
would prefer to take advantage of the positive economic climate and maximise pecuniary benefits 
(financial rewards). It would also be fair to say that naval ratings who decide to leave early, 
perceive the navy as a ‘stepping stone’, during which they accumulate the necessary qualifications 
and skills to subsequently secure employment in the civilian labour market.  To that extent, naval 
recruits benefit from joining the Service in terms of improved employability and higher financial 
rewards resulting from better training and skills acquisitions.  
 
It appears therefore that competing with a lucrative civilian job market and a thriving national 
economy is perhaps the most difficult challenges facing the navy. Fullerton (2003), and Steel 
(1996) for the US Air Force, Bellany (2003) for the British Army, and Crayton et al. (2003) for 
the US navy confirm the negative correlation between positive economic conditions (low 
unemployment) and low retention levels. According to Wyatt (1999) all these have put pressure 
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on naval manpower managers to consider the increased opportunity cost of remaining in the 
service. What the navy can do to alleviate the competitive pressures for the retention of skilled 
workforce is to promote more confidently the financial benefits accruing from working in the 
service. This would entail a better targeting of information regarding pecuniary benefits to 
potential recruits early on in their career, and/or the comparison of naval wages to civilian wages 
in similar occupations (e.g., engineers, medical assistants). Alternatively, the navy could devise a 
pay scheme which could ensure that naval pay rewards are in line with those offered by civilian 
employers’ or in line with growth in the civilian economy (LeFrere 2001).   
 
Progression prospects and possibilities within a hierarchical organisation such as the navy are 
very important influences on naval ratings’ decision making processes. Issues of routine, but also 
pride related to subsequent acceleration in the naval hierarchy are important influential factors on 
early exits from the navy. Individuals who feel that their contribution is not being recognised by 
being promoted to a higher rank will be more likely to leave early. This accord with the 
perception of the majority of navy personnel being proud and ambitious people, willing to work 
hard, but also requiring appropriate recognition for their effort. Otherwise their morale will 
decline and they will feel disillusioned with officers and administrative staff. In addition to that, 
progression up the ranks is associated with higher financial rewards (better pay). Those who do 
not progress through the ranks would feel particularly disadvantaged in terms of foregone 
income and start looking for alternative employment opportunities that would maximise their 
lifetime earnings.  
 
Navy manpower planners could tackle situations such as the one arising from slow progression 
prospects in a number of ways. Firstly, naval manpower planners could tackle feelings of 
monotony and tediousness by ensuring changes in the workload of people with slow promotion 
paths, or they could initiate a steady promotion flow pattern for those who find it difficult to 
progress to a higher rank.  Thus they could use the promotion mechanism as an inducement 
mechanism which would ensure timely promotion flow patterns, against promotion stagnation 
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(Wyatt, 1999). This argument is seen in the civilian economy, where Lincoln and Kalleberg (1996) 
found that extensive internal promotion in Japanese branch plants resulted in more committed 
employees. Secondly, navy planners could target an array of pecuniary and non – pecuniary 
benefits at ‘slow movers’. For example, financial reimbursement for a number of years, or 
towards their retirement scheme in order to make up for the foregone income from slow 
progression. Alternatively, these benefits could be in he form of welfare rewards (child care, 
dependent medical insurance etc), in order to show the navy’s appreciation for the commitment 
of these individuals to the Service.  
 
As far as the effect of operational tempo is concerned, the navy itself has recognised the 
importance of these disruptions on family life, the pressure of separation from friends and 
family, and the naval ratings’ ability to plan ahead (LeFrere 2001). For that reason Crayton et al. 
(2003) suggests that operational tempo is a very important determinant of quality of service in the 
navy. For low levels of operational tempo (one or two separations for sea duties) the navy should 
provide more non – pecuniary incentives (such as better facilities on board, the possibility of 
communicating through the internet with friends and family), in order to minimise feelings of 
discomfort and low morale and reduce disturbance of family life. In addition to that, the navy 
could utilise more efficiently its promotional and information material, in order to provide a 
more accurate picture of what is expected from new recruits during the initial stages of their 
career.  
 
Another initiative that could be considered by navy manpower managers is the achievement of 
more efficient management of manning and training margin requirements in the service. The 
Manning and training margin (MTM) includes naval personnel not available for duty at any given 
time due to illness, training, or condition of service. The Royal Air Force (RAF) in its corporate 
plan for 2004, paid particular attention to the minimisation of exempt personnel and the 
contractualisation of peripheral activities in order to reduce operational duties for active 
personnel (RAF Personnel Management Agency 2003). Thus, achieving a more effective 
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monitoring of MTM could allow managers to spread deployments at sea duties and reduce 
operational tempo for all naval ratings. Finally, one of the attractive attributes of navy 
employment (particularly to young naval ratings) is the ability to travel around the world. The 
navy could thus capitalise on this and allow naval ratings more flexibility, or more free time in the 
various ports of call.   
 
The nature of the training and skills that naval ratings receive from the navy also provides some 
very interesting policy implications for naval manpower planners. If those naval ratings who 
receive the most thorough training are those least likely to leave the navy, then managers ought 
to consider ways at which other specialisations could improve their skills and abilities in the 
service through the provision of additional on-the-job-training. The assumption behind this 
argument is that the more trained and skilled individuals are, the more efficient they would be in 
their job and thus the happier and more satisfied they would be with what they are doing. The 
navy could benefit from such a scheme as well, since the increased costs required for more 
training would be compensated through savings from re-training new people that come in to 
replace those who have left. The evidence from research regarding both the civilian economy 
(Lincoln and Kalleberg 1996) and the armed forces (Bowman and Mehay 1999, and ARI 
Newsletter 2003) suggest that continuing education and on-the-job training improves retention 
and increases commitment to the organisation. In addition to that, female naval ratings’ (married 
and unmarried) propensity to leave, high levels of training and skills increased loyalty to the navy, 
reducing early exits. Thus, improving educational opportunities while in the service (through 
training and skills acquisition) could act as a retention incentive for naval ratings.  
 
Regarding the effect of personal factors on the propensity to quit the navy, the literature seems to 
provide mixed evidence regarding the effect of age on retention and exit patterns. On the one 
hand, Fullerton (2003) examining exit patterns among US Air Force pilots, found that older 
pilots were more likely to leave than younger ones. On the other hand, Mehay and Hogan (1998) 
confirm the results derived from Table 1, identify younger naval ratings as being more likely to 
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leave the service early than older personnel. Also, Cregan and Johnston (1993) and Carnicer et al. 
(2004) examining quit patterns from civilian employment, also concluded that younger people are 
more likely to quit than more mature individuals. They attributed this to youngsters’ emotional 
immaturity and argued that perceived higher streams of income drive the higher propensity 
among young employees in the civilian economy.  
 
A possible explanation in the naval context may be that the reservation wage of younger naval 
ratings in the navy is quite low, so whenever a perceived better alternative (in terms of financial 
rewards) appears in the civilian economy, they are more likely to accept it. Another reason might 
be that more senior staff are also looking forward to a very competitive pension, so the closer the 
individual is to retirement, the less likely would be to leave (Crayton et al. 2003). Finally, a third 
reason that could be put forward relates to the greater willingness of young people to experiment 
with the civilian labour market (Boheim and Taylor 2000, and Stigher 1962). Younger naval 
ratings would only accumulate knowledge about the labour market by trying a variety of different 
jobs (Cregan and Johnston 1993). Extending this argument further, the results support the 
hypothesis that younger naval ratings perceive the navy as a ‘stepping stone’ in their professional 
career. The overall message coming out of the consideration of the age variable and its influence 
on the propensity to leave the Service, is that economic considerations and perceived financial 
opportunities influence much more prominently on younger naval ratings than more senior ones. 
The navy could to an extent reverse this pattern by communicating more persistently and 
consistently the number of financial incentives available during ones full LOS in the Service. 
Alternatively, the navy could consider the possibility of a second pension scheme that would 
apply to those reaching a critical point in their career (e.g., 12th year of Los), where the risk of exit 
is quite high. The objective of this policy initiative would be to smoothen out the effects of quit 
rates from the navy, by retaining young naval ratings for a few more years. This initiative has 
some obvious benefits with respect to retention in the navy and some additional financial costs 
have to be properly taken into account.   
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As far as the gender effect is concerned, the evidence on hand provides mixed results (Booth-
Kewley 2002 and Petrongolo 2001). In particular, whereas in the current study females were 
more likely to leave the navy their male counterparts, evidence from the US navy (Crayton et al. 
2003), as well as from the civilian labour market (Bradley et al. 2004, and Carnicer et al. 2004), 
argues that females are less likely to quit than males. The labour economics literature provides 
one potential explanation regarding differences between male and female exit patterns. Following 
the changes in the working conditions and patterns of employment, employees pay much more 
attention to ‘work/life’ balance nowadays. Hence, quality of service (Crayton et al. 2003) should 
feature as a very prominent retention mechanism in the navy. Financial rewards alone will not be 
enough to keep quality people in the service in the future. The navy should look to other quality 
of service factors and non pecuniary rewards (such as better family access to medical care, better 
accommodation schemes, more flexible assignment policies, and improved working conditions) 
in order to minimise the effect of early exits. This is particularly applicable in the case of female 
naval ratings since as Clark (1997) and Bender et al. (2005) have concluded, female employees are 
more drawn by the feelings of perceived job satisfaction than wage and promotion factors. This 
is also supported by Shields and Ward (2001) arguing that nurses’ (a female dominated 
occupation) intentions to quit the NHS are mostly affected by the lack of promotion and ‘on-the-
job’ training opportunities rather than financial factors. 
 
Finally, the evidence derived from gender and family factors on the propensity to leave early 
from the navy, indicates a potentially different influence of life cycle transitions, such as marital 
status on the decision to quit the Service (Carnicer et al. 2004, Mehay and Hogan 1998, and 
Warner and Goldberg 1984). Graph 7 above confirms this argument, clearly indicating that 
married females are more likely to quit either when compared to unmarried females, or married 
and unmarried males. The evidence on hand emphasises the need for the navy to consider 
appropriate policies that would be able to distinguish between the different needs of married and 
unmarried male and female naval ratings, respectively. As far as females are concerned, the focus 
of manpower managers should concentrate on welfare issues and problems related to family life, 
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as these appear to be of most concern for married females. The evidence derived from Table 3 
above, where females’ (married and unmarried) intentions to quit from the Service were 
negatively associated with highly skilled specialisations, compared to their male counterparts in 
the same specialisations supports the argument that the provision of continuous training would 
affect positively retention levels among female naval ratings. Male naval ratings on the other 
hand, tend to have a higher propensity to leave when they do not have any dependents to 
influence their decisions, and are mostly drawn by perceived financial rewards in the civilian 
employment.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper has used a large scale dataset generated from the combination of data from the 
JobStats and MARS datasets after the receipt of a data disclosure agreement from the Royal navy. 
Using in total 50000 individual naval ratings, the paper adopts a Cox proportional hazard 
approach to examine the likelihood of early exits (quits) from the navy. By using a Cox PH 
approach, the paper examines the effect of a number of explanatory variables on propensity to 
exit. These variables are characterised into external (macroeconomic considerations) and internal 
(job and person specific) factors. Descriptive analysis of the results shows that once naval ratings 
become full-blown sailors (i.e., after their initial training period) their propensity to leave early 
increased progressively, and reached a peak during the 4 to 13 years length of service in the navy. 
During this period of time, naval ratings are approximately 3 times more likely to quit than any 
other period in their career.  
 
With respect to the effect of (external) macroeconomic considerations on the propensity to quit, 
the empirical results confirm the negative influence of claimant count and inflation rates, and the 
positive influence of wage rates in the civilian economy on the propensity to leave the navy. The 
paper argues ratings have false perceptions regarding the relative attractiveness (increasing 
opportunity cost) of the civilian economy during periods of positive economic activity. As far as 
person – specific factors are concerned, the paper supports the ‘stepping – stone’ hypothesis 
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arising from the higher likelihood among younger naval ratings to quit the navy. Also, the 
empirical analysis suggests that female naval ratings are more likely to quit than male naval 
ratings. Nevertheless, this pattern is reversed when we consider navy specialisations involving 
high training costs and skilled personnel. Finally, the consideration of job – specific factors 
revealed that the navy could use more effectively the hierarchical nature of the organisation to 
improve retention, as those naval ratings who get promoted are less likely to leave. Also, navy 
manpower planners should consider more carefully policies targeting the degree of operational 
tempo in the Service.  
 
In terms of policy implications, the results point towards two particular directions. Firstly, navy 
planners should look to putting more emphasis on the changing patterns of employment and the 
requirements of naval ratings. Employees in both civilian and military employment pay more 
attention nowadays to issues of job satisfaction and motivation, and ‘work/life’ balance. 
Consequently planners should bear in mind the greater proportion of employees preferring to 
work part time, and the increasing pattern of dual wage earners in the household. All these imply 
that the navy should exercise more flexibility, while at the same time trying to provide motivation 
and job satisfaction through on-the-job training and improving the educational attainment of 
naval ratings. Secondly, a lot of attention should be placed on a mechanism that would recognise 
and reward individual commitment and ability. Initially, navy planners need to communicate 
more positively and energetically the financial rewards offered by the service to recruits. Also, 
existing managerial practices and mechanisms could be used more effectively. An example of this 
argument is the use of pension plans and the promotion mechanism to improve retention. The 
navy could introduce a second pension scheme (e.g., during the 12th, or 18th year of one’s career 
in the Service) in order to smoothen out the adverse effect of early exits from the navy, and allow 
navy manpower planners some time to recruit new personnel. Initiating a steady, or ‘honorary’ 
promotion plan for individual naval ratings could provide some sort of personal recognition of 
the commitment that individual naval ratings have put into the navy over the period of their 
career. 
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Table 1: Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
 
 Overall Males Females 
CCrate -0.174*** -.180*** -.149*** 
RPI -0.089** -.093*** -.086** 
AEI 0.143** .140*** .166*** 
Married  -.297*** .576*** 
Female 0.131*   
Marital_un~d 0.285*   
Fem_marr 0.774*   
AB_AB_LOS 0.032*** .033*** .016 
AB_LDG_LOS -0.015*** -.013*** -.030*** 
AB_MNE1_LOS -0.009*** -.006 -.530 
AB_PO_LOS -0.023*** -.018*** -.0581*** 
AB_CPO_LOS -0.006*** -.004 -.047** 
MNE1_MNE1_~S 0.015*** .017** -.190* 
MNE1_CPL_LOS -0.046*** -.046***  
MNE2_MNE2_~S 0.419** .457*** -1.238 
MNE2_CPL_LOS -0.076*** -.075***  
JNR_JNR_LOS -0.057* -.035 -.067 
JNR_LDG_LOS -0.026*** -.025*** -.015 
JNR_MNE1_LOS 0.018*** .019* -.225 
JNR_ORD_LOS 0.078** -.030 .301* 
JNRS_PO_LOS -0.031** -.029*** -.056 
JNR_CPO_LOS -0.043** -.041***  
ORD_ORD_LOS -0.107* -.105 -.015 
ORD_PO_LOS -0.054*** -.049*** -.069*** 
Train_art~d -3.345 -3.407***  
Train_trai~d -1.070* -1.133*** -.716*** 
Spec_AEA_A~S -0.928* -.914*** -2.102** 
Spec_AEM_M -0.088* -.116* .064 
Spec_AW 0.508* .514*** .380*** 
Spec_CA 0.489* .493*** .419** 
Spec_COM_G 0.365** .362*** .280** 
Spec_CORPS~N 0.397** .406***  
Spec_E_IS 0.397** .371*** .359** 
Spec_MEA 0.082* .086 -.134 
Spec_MEDAS~T -0.094** -.091 -.190 
Spec_MEM~L 0.607* .622*** .506** 
Spec_NA_AC 0.072* .125 -.142 
Spec_NOTRADE 1.415** 1.440*** 1.367*** 
Spec_OPCOM~Y 0.559** .584*** .375*** 
Spec_STEWARD 0.590* .600*** .437*** 
Spec_Stores 0.289* .290*** .167 
Spec_UW 0.502* .432*** .675*** 
Spec_WEA -0.372* -.362*** -.679* 
Spec_WEM_O 0.466* .465*** .329 
Spec_WRITER 0.203** .303*** -.009 
Ch1 0.545** .563*** .377*** 
Ch2 0.129** .138*** .028 
Ch3 -0.300** -.285*** -.484*** 
Ch4 -0.396** -.409*** -.396*** 
Agec -0.027*** -.029*** -.015 
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Agesqr 0.180** .185*** .237* 
Post96dummy 0.034** .057* -.035 
Dur1 (2-4 years) -0.062** -.158*** .375*** 
Dur2 (5 –6 years) 1.430** 1.476*** 1.325*** 
Dur3 (7 – 10 years) 1.309** 1.374*** 1.154*** 
Dur4 (11–14 years) 0.973* 1.036*** .786** 
Dur5 (15–18 years) 0.287* .355*** -.159 
Dur6 (19–23 years) -0.188* -.132 -.786* 
Dur7 (24–28 years) 0.837 .842*** 1.649*** 
Constant -5.398 -5.130*** -4.970*** 
legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
Table 2: Interactions between Gender, and Navy Specialisation‡ 
 
  
(Female+specialisation+female*spec) 
 
(navy Specialisation) 
CCrate  -0.17 
Female 0.13  
AEA_APPS [(0.13-0.89-1.37=) –2.13] –88.1% -0.23 
AEA_M 31% -0.14 
AW 109.6% -0.35 
CA 97.4% -0.31 
COM_G 69.6% -0.12 
CORPS  -0.05 
E_IS 85.9% -0.39 
MEA -2% -0.20 
MEDASS 3% -0.08 
MEM_L 113.8% -0.23 
NA_AC 9.4% -0.19 
NOTRADE 293.5% 0.02 
OPSCOM~Y 78.6% -0.21 
STEWARD 107.5% -0.27 
STORES 55.3% -0.21 
UW 174.6% -0.42 
WEA -42.9% -0.21 
WEM_O 89.6% -0.24 
WRITER 25.9% -0.12 
‡ The figures can de interpreted as percentage propensity to quit the navy 
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 Graph 1: Predicted Overall Hazard of Exit
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 Graph 5: Predicted Hazard of Exit by Gender
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Fig 4: Predicted Hazard of Exit by Gender and Marital
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Table 3: Interactions between Gender, Marital Status, Specialisation and LoS* 
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-45 -42.6 -40.9 -14.8 -62.7 -38.8 -51.7
24-28yrs
 
-34.5
 
236.5
 
164
 
167.3
 
158.9
 
198.3
 
81.5
 
149.9
 
166.3
 
114.3
 
151
 
145.1
 
156.2
 
163.8
 
280.1
 
66.5
 
172.9
 
115.5
 
U
n
m
a
r
r
i
e
d
 
F
e
m
a
l
e
 
o
v
e
r
 
U
n
m
a
r
r
i
e
d
 
M
a
l
e
 
                    
 31 
